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Abstract: 
Does the impact of international Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
inspections extend beyond country borders of inspected auditors? We investigate this question 
by examining multinational business groups. Following initial PCAOB inspections of 
accounting firms auditing foreign U.S.-listed global ultimate owners, our findings indicate that 
their international subsidiaries decrease earnings management. Research design choices such 
as the comparison of treated observations with same country-industry-year control observations 
and a fixed effects structure that controls for country, industry, year, and group characteristics 
mitigate concerns of omitted variables. Our paper provides evidence for benefits of 
international PCAOB inspections over and above the previously documented effects for firms 
located in the countries of the inspected auditors. 
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1 Introduction 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) regularly inspects 
accounting firms that perform audits, issue audit reports, or provide related services for U.S.-
listed companies. This also applies to non-U.S. auditors performing such tasks for U.S.-listed 
firms not located in the U.S. An extensive stream of literature documents improvements in audit 
quality for audit clients of U.S. and non-U.S. auditors after their initial PCAOB inspection (see, 
e.g., Carcello, Holligsorth, and Mastrolia, 2011; Gramling, Krishnan, and Zhang, 2011; Abbott, 
Gunny, and Zhang, 2013; Gunny and Zhang, 2013; Boone, Khurana, and Raman, 2015; Defond 
and Lennox, 2011; Defond and Lennox, 2017; Fung, Raman, and Zhu, 2017; Gipper, Leuz, and 
Maffett, 2019; Krishnan, Krishnan, and Song, 2017). Our paper focuses on initial PCAOB 
inspections of non-U.S. auditors and investigates their international transmission effects.  
We analyze the international transmission within multinational business groups (i.e. 
business groups consisting of a global ultimate owner (GUO) and subsidiaries that are located 
in a different country than their GUO). We document a transmission effect of initial PCAOB 
inspections concerning non-U.S. auditors of foreign U.S.-listed GUOs within the business 
group that results in a reduction of earnings management of the GUOs’ international 
subsidiaries. In doing so, our study furthers the understanding of the effects of international 
PCAOB inspections on audit clients’ international subsidiaries. Our paper also provides 
evidence for international benefits of foreign PCAOB inspections over and above the benefits 
for firms located in the country of the inspected auditor as documented in prior literature. 
Recent papers document a potential cross-country transmission effect between the 
members of multinational business groups (see, e.g., Cravino and Levchenko, 2017; Bena, 
Dinc, and Erel, 2019). In addition, literature shows extensive GUO power on subsidiaries’ 
financial structure, operating activities, and financial reporting activities (see, e.g., Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew, 2012; Robinson and Stocken, 2013; Shroff, Verdi, and Yu, 2014; 
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Beuselinck, Cascino, Deloof, and Vanstraelen, 2018). Therefore, we hypothesize that initial 
PCAOB inspections of GUO auditors have an effect on the earnings management of 
international subsidiaries. 
However, the direction of such a transmission effect on subsidiary-level earnings 
management is not obvious. On the one hand, GUOs could shift earnings management from the 
consolidated group level to international subsidiaries after an increase in audit quality at the 
consolidated reports level arising from initial PCAOB inspections of their auditor. This 
hypothesis is supported by Beuselinck et al. (2018), who show that GUOs located in relatively 
strict jurisdictions shift earnings management to international subsidiaries located in 
jurisdictions with weaker regulations.  
On the other hand, earnings management of international subsidiaries could decrease 
following an initial PCAOB inspection of the GUO auditor. GUO managers could influence 
subsidiary managers to align earnings management practices with the improved audit quality at 
the consolidated accounts level. In addition, GUO managers could aim to lower earnings 
management of international subsidiaries as managing earnings at the level of international 
subsidiaries increases the circle of people that are aware of these accounting practices and 
automatically raises the risk of detection (Dyreng et al., 2012). 
We download ownership, financial, and auditor data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis 
database and define a GUO as a firm that directly or indirectly holds at least 50.01% in a 
subsidiary and is itself not owned by a single corporate shareholder by more than 25% or by a 
single non-corporate shareholder by more than 50%. We compare a treatment and a control 
group to examine whether initial PCAOB inspections of the GUO auditor have an effect on 
international subsidiaries. We classify international subsidiaries as part of our treatment sample 
if the auditor of their foreign U.S.-listed GUO is initially PCAOB-inspected. We construct a 
two-year window for treated subsidiaries around the inspection year consisting of the year prior 
to and the year after the inspection. International subsidiaries in the control group have a foreign 
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U.S.-listed GUO but do not experience an initial PCAOB inspection of their GUO’s auditor 
before or during our sample period. We retain subsidiary observations from the same country-
industry-year group as treated subsidiaries for the control group.  
We focus on non-U.S. auditors experiencing an initial PCAOB inspection between 2009 
and 2016. Our version of Orbis provides subsidiary financial data for ten years (in our case 
2008 through 2017). Since we analyze the years before and after an inspection as described 
above, we cover inspections between 2009 and 2016. 1  The final sample contains 744 
subsidiary-year observations for the treated group and 2,815 subsidiary-year observations for 
the control group.  
We measure subsidiary earnings management using absolute discretionary accruals. 
Following Beuselinck et al. (2018), we construct our measure as the absolute value of the 
residuals from a performance-adjusted modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 
1995; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005). We focus on absolute abnormal accruals (a proxy 
for accounting discretion) rather than on signed abnormal accruals (a proxy for audit quality) 
for two reasons. First, we are interested in the transmission effect on subsidiary accounting 
discretion irrespective of whether it is applied to increase or decrease earnings. Second, we do 
not analyze firms that are directly audited by inspected auditors and therefore audit quality may 
not be an appropriate measure to examine a transmission effect on subsidiaries. 
Our regression estimates document a decrease in earnings management of international 
subsidiaries with U.S.-listed GUOs in the year following an initial PCAOB inspection of the 
GUO’s non-U.S. auditor. Our baseline regression model controls for a number of subsidiary 
characteristics that could determine earnings management. The baseline regression also 
includes subsidiary-country, subsidiary-industry, year, and GUO-country fixed effects to 
                                                     
1 Therefore, we cannot investigate initial PCAOB inspections of auditors before the sample period but focus on 
non-U.S. auditors that were initially inspected during our sample period (e.g. we do not include the initial PCAOB 
inspection of BDO UK in 2006 in our sample, but we investigate the initial PCAOB inspection of Deloitte UK in 
2010).  
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control for potential determinants of subsidiary-level earnings management that are specific to 
a subsidiary country, a subsidiary industry, a year, or a GUO country. We continue to find a 
significantly negative effect on subsidiary earnings management when we replace GUO-
country fixed effects with group fixed effects to control for time-invariant GUO attributes (that 
include, but go beyond, a GUO’s country). Our documented effect is also economically 
significant. The main result reveals an average decrease of 17.38% of the pre-inspection 
standard deviation in absolute discretionary accruals following an initial PCAOB inspection of 
the GUO auditor.  
Our effect is corroborated by a number of robustness tests. We continue to find a 
significantly negative effect of a foreign GUO’s auditor’s initial PCAOB inspection on 
subsidiary earnings management when we additionally control for various GUO earnings 
management incentives. We also show that our results are not unduly influenced by individual 
countries that make up significant parts of our sample. In addition, we verify our earnings 
management proxy by including control variables that were used in the regression to determine 
our earnings management measure and by varying the construction of our proxy. Additional 
analyses show that our documented effect on subsidiary earnings management is larger for 
international subsidiaries located in countries that permit PCAOB inspections. 
A major advantage of our setting is the staggered nature of initial foreign PCAOB 
inspections over years, countries, and audit firms. Due to the international ownership structure 
of our sample, the treatment of subsidiaries in our sample is staggered over years, subsidiary 
countries, GUO countries, and GUO auditors. This substantially raises the bar for omitted 
variables or reverse causality as alternative explanations for our results.  
The empirical implementation of our research question aims to further reduce 
endogeneity concerns. First, we employ a control group and an extensive fixed effects structure 
to isolate the effect of a PCAOB inspection of the GUO auditor on subsidiaries’ earnings 
management. The strict requirements for control observations ensure that differences in the 
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subsidiary country, in the subsidiary industry, or in years do not drive our results. The fixed 
effects structure employed in our estimations also helps decrease the likelihood of omitted 
variables confounding our inferences. Second, GUO characteristics could correlate with both 
subsidiary earnings management and PCAOB initial inspections. However, as the focus of 
PCAOB inspections are primarily auditors, but not audit clients or their subsidiaries, such a 
correlation seems unlikely. Nevertheless, we control for correlated time-invariant GUO 
characteristics by using group fixed effects in our main model, and we control for time-variant 
GUO characteristics related to GUO earnings management incentives in additional tests. 
Overall, the staggered nature of inspections, our strict requirements for the control group, the 
use of a tight fixed effects structure, and the inclusion of control variables mitigate concerns 
regarding alternative explanations of our findings. 
Our study contributes to the literature in three major ways. First, to our knowledge, our 
paper is the first to investigate the effect of PCAOB inspections on multinational business 
groups. Krishnan et al. (2017) document an improvement in the audit quality of U.S.-listed 
foreign audit clients after PCAOB inspections. It is unclear if this improvement spills over to 
international subsidiaries’ earnings management. On the one hand, Beuselinck et al. (2018) 
document a shift of earnings management from GUOs to international subsidiaries when the 
strictness of regulations increases in the GUO country. On the other hand, related studies 
suggests that, after PCAOB inspections, the audit quality also increases for firms that are not in 
the scope of the regulations assessed by the PCAOB (see, e.g., Fung et al., 2017). We contribute 
to these studies by documenting a decrease in earnings management of international 
subsidiaries of audit clients after PCAOB inspections.  
Second, we contribute to the research on externalities of international PCAOB 
inspections by introducing an additional international dimension. Fung et al. (2017) provide 
evidence for externalities on non-U.S.-listed clients of inspected auditors and hence document 
positive effects on firms for which the U.S. regulations assessed by the PCAOB do not apply. 
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While they study firms located in the country of the inspected auditor, our paper, to our 
knowledge, is the first study to examine the effect on firms not located in the country of the 
inspected auditor. Additionally, literature on both U.S. and non-U.S. inspections focuses on the 
benefits for direct clients of inspected auditors (see, e.g., Carcello et al., 2011; Gramling et al., 
2011; Abbott et al., 2013; Gunny and Zhang, 2013; Boone et al., 2015; Defond and Lennox, 
2017; Fung et al., 2017; Gipper et al., 2019; Krishnan et al., 2017). In investigating the effect 
of a GUO-auditor inspection on international subsidiaries, we extend this research by providing 
evidence of benefits for firms that are not directly audited by the PCAOB-inspected accounting 
firms in our sample. 
Third, we contribute to the nascent stream of literature studying cross-border 
transmission effects within multinational business groups. We extend this research by 
documenting a transmission effect of an auditor inspection at the GUO level on accounting 
practices of international subsidiaries. Our findings add to the evidence provided by Beuselinck 
et al. (2018) who examine the characteristics that influence the degree of earnings management 
pressure put on international subsidiaries by GUOs. We also extend research by Cravino and 
Levchenko (2017) and Bena et al. (2019) who analyze the transmission effects within 
multinational business groups. While Cravino and Levchenko (2017) document a transmission 
of business cycles between GUOs and international subsidiaries, Bena et al. (2019) show a 
transmission effect of crises between international subsidiaries. We find that international 
subsidiaries decrease their earnings management practices following an auditor inspection at 
the consolidated reports level. This provides evidence of potential earnings management 
alignment across borders within multinational business groups. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background 
information and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data sources, research design, 
and sample construction. We discuss the main results and robustness tests in Section 4. Section 
5 contains concluding remarks. 
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2 PCAOB International Inspections & Hypothesis Development 
2.1 PCAOB International Inspections 
The PCAOB was established through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. With the aim of 
improving audit quality of U.S.-listed firms, the PCAOB has the authority to perform 
inspections of PCAOB-registered auditors. Accounting firms need to register with the PCAOB 
if they perform audits, issue audit reports, or provide services with regards to such reports for 
U.S.-listed companies. This applies to both U.S. and non-U.S. audit firms. During inspections, 
the PCAOB assesses auditors’ compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, PCAOB policies, the 
regulations of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), and professional standards.  
The PCAOB began with inspections of U.S. auditors in 2004 and with inspections of 
non-U.S. auditors (i.e. international inspections) in 2005. In addition to the first (i.e. initial) 
inspection, auditors that regularly issue audit reports for more than 100 U.S.-issuers are 
inspected annually, auditors that regularly issue less than 100 audit reports for U.S.-issuers are 
generally inspected at least once every three years (Krishnan et al., 2017; Fung et al., 2017). 
Foreign initial inspections were staggered over time, countries, and audit firms. The PCAOB 
provides inspection reports with information on applied inspection methodologies and audit 
quality issues. Additionally, it provides detailed information on quality control issues if auditors 
fail to address such issues satisfactorily within 12 month after the report date.2  
We focus on initial international PCAOB inspections in our analysis, specifically on 
subsidiaries if the non-U.S. auditor of their foreign U.S.-listed GUO is initially PCAOB-
inspected.  
                                                     
2 Information on unsatisfactorily addressed quality control issues are provided on the official PCAOB website 
https://pcaobus.org. 
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2.2 Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
While an extensive stream of literature provides evidence for benefits arising from 
public oversight bodies that overview the audit profession (see, e.g., Lamoreaux, 2016; Carson 
et al., 2017), the most prominent and discussed national public accounting oversight body is 
the PCAOB.3 Literature documents an improvement in audit quality after PCAOB inspections 
of U.S. auditors (see, e.g., Carcello et al., 2011; Gramling et al., 2011; Abbott et al., 2013; 
Gunny and Zhang, 2013; Boone et al., 2015; Defond and Lennox, 2017).4 Further studies find 
that international PCAOB inspections are associated with higher audit quality for both U.S.-
listed and non-U.S.-listed audit clients of inspected non-U.S. auditors (Krishnan et al., 2017; 
Fung et al., 2017). In doing so, this literature provides evidence for positive externalities of 
international PCAOB inspections on non-U.S.-listed public firms, even though these are not 
the intended subjects of PCAOB inspections (Fung et al., 2017).5 
We hypothesize that initial international PCAOB inspections have an effect on 
international subsidiaries of foreign U.S.-listed clients that are audited by an inspected auditor. 
Consider company X that is located in Australia and listed in the U.S. Company X is the GUO 
of subsidiary Y. Subsidiary Y is located in Italy (i.e. it is an international subsidiary). Ernst & 
Young Australia audits the financial reports of company X. In our study, we analyze the 
transmission effect of the initial PCAOB inspection of Ernst & Young Australia on subsidiary 
Y, specifically its earnings management. A change in subsidiary earnings management would 
arise from a transmission of an event at the GUO level to the subsidiary level. While it is not a 
                                                     
3 Carson et al. (2017) find an improvement in audit quality after initial auditor inspections by national public 
oversight bodies. Lamoreaux (2016) provides evidence for positive effects on audit quality arising from an existing 
threat of PCAOB inspections following the admission of PCAOB inspections in countries. 
4 These papers document subsequent improvements in audit quality. Gipper, Leuz, and Maffett (2019) analyze the 
effect on how investors evaluate audit quality following PCAOB inspections. They find that reporting credibility 
increases after such inspections. 
5 Studies covering effects of PCAOB inspections on non-accounting outcomes are rare. Carcello, Carver, and Neal 
(2011) document a negative reaction of investors to the information that PCAOB international inspections are not 
allowed in a country. Shroff (2017) shows an increase in external capital and investment in periods after PCAOB 
inspections. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277474 
9 
 
priori clear if such a transmission effect exists, a nascent literature in accounting, economics, 
and finance has started to provide evidence of possible transmissions within multinational 
groups. 
Recent literature analyzes transmissions of business cycles and financial decisions 
within multinational business groups (see, e.g., Shroff et al., 2014; Cravino and Levchenko, 
2017; Di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean, 2018; Tweedle, 2018; Beaver et al., 2019).6 In 
addition to the vertical transmission of shocks between GUOs and subsidiaries, shocks can also 
be transmitted horizontally between subsidiaries of multinational groups in different countries. 
Bena et al. (2019) document a decrease of investment in international subsidiaries if other 
international subsidiaries of the same group are located in countries experiencing an economic 
crisis. 7  In addition, studies provide evidence for extensive GUO power on international 
subsidiaries’ financial structure, operating activities, and financial reporting activities (see, e.g., 
Aylmer, 1970; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2012; Robinson and Stocken, 2013; Beuselinck 
et al., 2018). Chen and Conaway (2019) document positive market reactions for GUOs that are 
both U.S.-domiciled and U.S.-listed upon the announcement of international PCAOB 
inspections in the countries of their foreign subsidiaries. 
The literature analyzed above provides evidence for improvements in audit quality of 
foreign U.S.-listed firms after initial PCAOB inspections of their auditor (Krishnan et al., 2017). 
In addition, studies analyze possible transmission effects within multinational business groups 
(Shroff et al., 2014; Cravino and Levchenko, 2017; Bena et al., 2019; Beuselinck et al., 2018). 
We analyze the transmission effect of an initial PCAOB inspection of the foreign U.S.-listed 
GUO’s auditor on international subsidiaries’ earnings management. The direction of the effect 
on earnings management at the international subsidiary level is not a priori clear. On the one 
                                                     
6 A range of papers also analyzes tax-motivated income shifting within multinational business groups (see, e.g., 
De Simone, 2016; De Simone, Klassen, and Seidman, 2017; Klassen, Lisowsky, and Seidman, 2017; Hopland et 
al., 2018). 
7 The majority of the literature on multinational business groups uses ownership data from Orbis to construct links 
between GUOs and subsidiaries. 
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hand, GUOs could shift earnings management from the consolidated group level to the level of 
international subsidiaries after an increase in audit quality at the consolidated level arising from 
initial PCAOB inspections of their auditor. Literature provides examples for such strategies. 
Beuselinck et al. (2018) show that GUOs located in jurisdictions with stricter regulations shift 
earnings management to the international subsidiary level of subsidiaries located in 
jurisdictions with weaker regulations. Hence, GUO managers could decide to shift earnings 
management to the level of international subsidiaries after the audit quality increase at the 
consolidated reports level arising from initial PCAOB inspections.8  
On the other hand, earnings management of international subsidiaries with foreign U.S.-
listed GUOs could decrease following an initial PCAOB inspection of the GUO’s non-U.S. 
auditor. As discussed above, an extensive stream of literature provides evidence for 
improvements in audit quality following PCAOB inspections. Therefore, GUO managers could 
influence subsidiary managers to align earnings management practices with the improved audit 
quality at the consolidated accounts level. This could be a cautionary step to avoid reputational 
penalties if the GUO auditor detects aggressive earnings management at the international 
subsidiary level, as GUO managers cannot gauge the extent of increased scrutiny by auditors 
prior to the first audit after the initial PCAOB inspection. As the PCAOB also detects audit 
deficiencies relating to auditors’ reliance on other auditors, it is plausible that GUO auditors 
improve their scrutiny of other auditors’ work (e.g. subsidiary auditors) after PCAOB 
inspections (Carson et al., 2018). 
In addition, managing earnings at the level of international subsidiaries increases the 
circle of people that are aware of such accounting practices (Dyreng et al., 2012). This 
automatically increases the risk of discovery, especially in periods with improved audit 
                                                     
8 Additionally, Beuselinck et al. (2018) show that the influence of GUOs on subsidiary earnings management 
varies with subsidiary integration and the degree of earnings management opportunities. 
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investigations as GUO managers cannot gauge the extent of auditors’ additional analyses and 
more detailed investigations ex ante.  
Awareness of PCAOB inspections and resulting closer audit scrutiny also play a major 
role for the effects on subsidiaries’ accounting practices (see, e.g., Fung et al., 2017). Hence, 
initial PCAOB inspections of GUO auditors could increase awareness of the effects arising 
from more detailed audit inspections for managers of international subsidiaries. As a result, 
managers of foreign international subsidiaries could decide to lower earnings management to 
reduce the likelihood of negative consequences arising from potential closer inspections.  
Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that the degree of international subsidiary 
earnings management changes following initial international PCAOB inspections of foreign 
U.S.-listed GUO auditors. We formulate the following hypothesis in the null form as the 
directional effect on earnings management is a priori unclear: 
H1: There is no effect of an initial PCAOB inspection concerning the auditor of a 
foreign U.S.-listed GUO on earnings management of its international subsidiaries. 
3 Data, Methodology, and Sample Construction 
3.1 Data and Group Construction 
3.1.1 Data 
We obtain ownership, financial, and auditor data from the web-interface of Orbis, a 
database provided by Bureau van Dijk. By collecting firm data from annual reports and national 
databases, Orbis provides information on private and listed companies. In addition to financial 
data, Orbis provides ownership information that enables the construction of ownership links 
between companies. As Orbis relies to a large extent on information provided by national 
registries, data availability depends on the reporting requirements of national jurisdictions. 
Even though this results in cross-country variations of private firm coverage, studies show that 
cross-country coverage of private firms is comparable to other databases such as Eurostat 
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(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2015; Alfaro and Chen, 2018). Ownership data provided by Orbis is 
static and presented as of the day the latest information was provided to Orbis.9, 10  
We obtain data on PCAOB-inspected auditors from the official website of the 
PCAOB.11 It is crucial to identify the first PCAOB inspection report of an audit firm as we 
follow Krishnan et al. (2017) and Fung et al. (2017) and focus on the effect of the initial PCAOB 
inspection of foreign auditors. To this end, we manually analyze PCAOB reports and link initial 
PCAOB inspection dates to all legal entity names under which the inspected auditor has issued 
reports. 12  We examine initial international PCAOB inspections from 2009 through 2016. 
Foreign PCAOB inspections started in 2005. However, our version of Orbis provides subsidiary 
financial data for ten years (in our case 2008 through 2017). We obtain macroeconomic data 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook Database through the 
website of the IMF. We download GDP data based on purchasing-power-parity per capita and 
inflation data based on average consumer prices.13  
                                                     
9 If e.g. subsidiary Y becomes a member of multinational group X in 2014 and ownership information downloaded 
in 2018 was last updated in 2017 for group X, we treat subsidiary Y as member of the group X for the entire sample 
period from 2008 to 2017. As a consequence, if group X’s GUO auditor is audited in 2011, we would assign a 
GUO-auditor inspection to subsidiary Y in the year 2011, even though it was not a member of group X in 2011. 
Similarly, we treat subsidiary Z that left group W in 2014 as not being a member of group W for the entire sample 
period from 2008 to 2017. At the same time, we would not link the inspection of group W’s GUO auditor in 2011 
to subsidiary Z, even though it was a member of the group in 2011. As a consequence, the static nature of Orbis 
ownership data could lead to a measurement error. However, if anything, this would work against us in our 
empirical estimation. 
10 Cravino and Levchenko (2017) also use Orbis data to construct multinational group structures. They analyze 
whether changes in ownership that are not considered due to the static nature of Orbis’ ownership data influence 
their results. To do so, they compare the ownership structure information from Orbis obtained at two different 
points in time. Specifically, they compare the ownership structure from the download of the data they use with the 
ownership structure from three years earlier (they obtain this data from an older Orbis vintage on a DVD-ROM) 
to obtain ownership changes. They first exclude subsidiaries for which they observe a change in ownership. 
Second, they keep subsidiaries without an observed change in ownership. Throughout these tests, they show that 
the ownership changes do not influence their results. 
11  Information on PCAOB-inspected auditors is obtained from https://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Pages/ 
default.aspx. 
12 For instance, the initial PCAOB inspection report for Deloitte Accountants B.V. in the Netherlands mentions 
that Deloitte Accountants B.V. has also issued audit reports under the name DT Accountants BV 
(https://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Documents/2015_Deloitte_Accountants_B_V.pdf). The inspection date 
of this report is assigned to both Deloitte Accountants B.V. and DT Accountants BV. 
13 We download GDP data from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database subject “Gross domestic product 
based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP (current international dollar)” and inflation 
data from the subject “Inflation, average consumer prices (index)”. 
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3.1.2 Group Construction and Data Preparation 
We analyze the transmission effect of a PCAOB inspection at the GUO-auditor level 
within a multinational business group, more specifically on international subsidiaries. 
Therefore, we define a GUO and its subsidiaries as members of the same business group. Our 
group construction follows two steps. In the first step, we download data on firms that are 
classified as GUOs from Orbis. In doing so, we define GUOs as firms that own at least 50.01% 
directly or indirectly in a subsidiary. Additionally, a corporate shareholder must not own more 
than 25% in a GUO.14 In this GUO-level download, Orbis does not provide data on non-
corporate GUOs such as individuals and families. Therefore, this approach excludes non-
corporate GUOs.15, 16 For the download, we prefer annual reports over local registry filings. We 
follow Shroff et al. (2014) and Beuselinck et al. (2018) and obtain data from consolidated 
accounts of GUOs. In the second step, we download data for subsidiaries of the previously 
defined GUOs through the subsidiary-GUO information in Orbis.17 Orbis provides a variable 
indicating the GUO of a subsidiary. We prefer local registry filings over annual reports and 
require that unconsolidated accounts are available for subsidiaries (this approach follows 
Cravino and Levchenko (2016)). We exclude GUOs and subsidiaries with no recent or limited 
financial information in both steps. We download GUO and subsidiary financial data as well as 
GUO-auditor data from 2008 to 2017, as data availability of our Orbis web-interface version is 
constrained to ten years. We download financial data in U.S. Dollar. 
Subsidiaries within a group have the same GUO that holds at least 50.01% directly or 
indirectly in the subsidiaries. We define international subsidiaries as subsidiaries located in a 
                                                     
14  We classify corporate shareholders as companies of the following types: banks and financial companies, 
insurance companies, corporate companies, private equity firms, hedge funds, venture capital, mutual and pension 
funds/trusts, publicly listed companies. 
15 Orbis assigns non-corporate GUOs to subsidiaries. However, information on this GUO-type is only available in 
subsidiary-level downloads.  
16 Due to this approach and the filters described above, individuals and families can own between 25% and 50% 
of a GUO. 
17 We use BvD ID numbers to identify subsidiaries of the previously defined GUOs. 
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different country than the GUO and drop subsidiaries that do not fulfill this definition.18 We 
only keep subsidiaries where both GUOs and subsidiaries have more than U.S. $10,000 
turnover and total assets in at least one year of the selected period (this requirement follows 
Shroff et al. (2014)). We exclude subsidiaries and subsidiaries with GUOs from financial and 
utilities industries (primary two-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes 64-66, 35-39).  
We download GUO information regarding current and previous auditors as well as 
auditor appointment and resignation dates. We exclude subsidiary-year observations without 
available data on GUO auditors.19 Following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015), we drop subsidiary-
year observations where the country codes generated from BvD IDs do not correspond to 
country codes provided in Orbis and if total assets, turnover, and employees information are 
missing simultaneously. We also exclude the entire subsidiary from our sample if total assets, 
tangible fixed assets, or the number of employees is negative in any of the years. 
3.2 Measure of Earnings Management 
We measure the magnitude of subsidiary-level earnings management by the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals. We follow Beuselinck et al. (2018) and apply a performance-
adjusted modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005) to measure 
discretionary accruals using the residuals of the following regression: 
𝑇𝐶𝐴௦,௧
𝑇𝐴௦,௧ିଵ
=  𝛽଴
1
𝑇𝐴௦,௧ିଵ
+ 𝛽ଵ
൫∆𝑅𝐸𝑉௦,௧ − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶௦,௧൯
𝑇𝐴௦,௧ିଵ
+  𝛽ଶ 𝑅𝑂𝐴௦,௧ିଵ
+  𝛽ଷ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௖,௧ିଵ +  𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻௖,௧ିଵ +  𝜀௦,௧ 
(1) 
                                                     
18 This approach defines a multinational business group if at least one international subsidiary is a member of the 
group. We vary the number of international subsidiaries required to define a multinational group in untabulated 
robustness tests. The canon of our main result remains unchanged if we require multinational groups to have at 
least 10, 20, 30, or 40 international subsidiaries. 
19 We define GUO auditors for subsidiary-year observations by using information on previous and current GUO 
auditors from Orbis. For previous GUO auditors, we define GUO-auditor tenure by appointment and resignation 
dates. GUO-auditor tenure for current auditors is defined as period after the appointment date. We assign GUO 
auditors to subsidiary-year observations within the GUO-auditor tenure. We exclude subsidiary-year observations 
if this approach provides more than one GUO auditor for a subsidiary-year observation.  
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where s, t, and c index subsidiaries, years, and countries. For the estimation of regression (1), 
we follow existing literature and pool observations across industries and year groups while we 
require each group to have at least ten observations (see, e.g., Beuselinck et al., 2018; Chaney 
et al., 2011; Krishnan et al., 2017). Discretionary accruals are measured for each subsidiary-
year observation as the residual from the regression. 𝑇𝐶𝐴௦,௧ describes the total current accruals 
of subsidiary s in year t and is calculated as 
𝑇𝐶𝐴௦,௧ = ൫∆𝐶𝐴௦,௧ −  ∆𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻௦,௧൯ − ൫∆𝐶𝐿௦,௧ −  ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷௦,௧൯ − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௦,௧ (2) 
where ∆𝐶𝐴௦,௧, ∆𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻௦,௧, ∆𝐶𝐿௦,௧, and ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷௦,௧ describe the change in total current assets, cash 
and cash equivalents, current liabilities, and short-term debt of subsidiary s from year t-1 to t. 
𝑇𝐴௦,௧ିଵ denotes total assets and 𝑅𝑂𝐴௦,௧ିଵ denotes return on assets of subsidiary s in year t-1. 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉௦,௧ and ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶௦,௧ are the changes in revenues and receivables of subsidiary s from t-1 to t, 
respectively. 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௖,௧ିଵ controls for inflation and 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻௖,௧ିଵ for change in 
real purchasing power based GDP, both measuring the respective value in country c for year t-
1. We follow Beuselinck et al. (2018) for the construction of the model using subsidiary 
financial data from Orbis and economic data from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database.20  
We analyze the degree of accounting discretion applied through earnings management 
by using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as dependent variable for two reasons. 
First, the signed value could be interpreted as a proxy for audit quality. Whereas audit quality 
is of major interest at the U.S.-listed GUO level due to the inspection of its auditor, we aim to 
measure the transmission effect on international subsidiaries’ degree of accounting discretion 
irrespective of whether it is applied to increase or decrease earnings. Hence, we use absolute 
discretionary accruals instead of signed accruals. Whereas lower signed discretionary accruals 
                                                     
20 Our estimation of accruals follows the balance sheet approach. This estimation could miscalculate accruals if 
non-operating events (e.g. mergers, divestitures) impact current assets and liabilities while they do not influence 
earnings (Hribar and Collins, 2002). However, it is not possible to calculate accruals with the cash flow approach 
due to the data availability of subsidiaries’ cash flow information. 
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indicate higher audit quality, we measure earnings management through the absolute value, as 
we aim to measure the degree of accounting discretion, irrespective of the direction of earnings 
management. Second, we do not analyze firms that are directly audited by inspected accounting 
firms but subsidiaries of these firms. Hence, audit quality may not be the appropriate measure 
to analyze the transmission effect of PCAOB inspections. 
3.3 Methodology  
We analyze the transmission effect of international PCAOB inspections concerning 
auditors of foreign U.S.-listed GUOs on their international subsidiaries’ earnings management. 
We implement this analysis by defining a treatment and control group. International 
subsidiaries are treated if the auditor of their foreign U.S.-listed GUO is initially PCAOB-
inspected.  
We analyze the effect on earnings management of treated subsidiaries from the pre-
inspection to the post-inspection year. Therefore, we construct a two-year window consisting 
of the year before and the year following the initial PCAOB inspection of the GUO auditor for 
our treatment group. We define the year of the final PCAOB inspection report and classify 
international subsidiaries as treated if their foreign U.S.-listed GUO is audited by an initially 
inspected auditor.21 Ideally, we could compare an international subsidiary in the year following 
the initial PCAOB inspections of the GUO auditor with the same subsidiary that did not 
experience the treatment. As this is not possible, we use a control group. For the construction 
of the control group, we start with all international subsidiaries of foreign U.S.-listed GUOs. 
We exclude subsidiaries whose GUO auditor experiences an initial PCAOB inspection before 
or during our sample period. We retain subsidiary-year observations from the same country-
                                                     
21 We follow prior literature (see, e.g., Fung et al., 2017; Krishnan et al., 2017) for the analysis around the year of 
the final PCAOB inspection report. 
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industry-year combinations as treated subsidiaries (Krishnan et al., 2017).22 We exclude treated 
subsidiaries if no control observations are available for the country-industry-year 
combination.23 
We require that subsidiaries in the control group have a foreign U.S.-listed GUO as 
U.S.-listed firms face a specific set of regulations. We do not include subsidiaries with non-
U.S.-listed GUOs in the control group, as this would raise the concern that subsidiaries of U.S.-
listed-GUOs adjust earnings management practices following foreign PCAOB inspections in 
general, rather than due to the inspection of their GUO auditor. U.S.-listed firms differ from 
non-U.S.-listed firms as literature provides evidence that they tend to have higher accounting 
quality (see, e.g., Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003). 
We only include international subsidiaries in our control group. In doing so, we control 
for the possibility that international subsidiaries react differently to events at the GUO level 
than national subsidiaries. Additionally, literature provides evidence that international and 
national subsidiaries significantly differ with regard to earnings management practices and 
financial characteristics (see, e.g., Gill-de-Albornoz and Rusanescu, 2017; Gill-de-Albornoz et 
al., 2018). 
We are interested in capturing the effect on treated subsidiaries in the year after the 
inspection. Therefore, we construct an indicator variable that equals one for the first year 
following the final report of the initial PCAOB inspection of a GUO’s auditor, and zero 
otherwise (we call this variable POST_INSPECTION) (Krishnan et al., 2017; Chan et al., 2012). 
To analyze the effect of initial PCAOB inspections of GUO auditors on subsidiaries’ earnings 
management, we estimate the following subsidiary-level regression:  
                                                     
22 Note that we do not construct two-year windows for control subsidiaries. In untabulated robustness tests, we 
also construct two-year windows for control subsidiaries. The canon of our main results remains unchanged. 
23 We cannot require subsidiaries in the control group to have same GUO-country and GUO-industry combinations 
as treated subsidiaries as this would reduce the sample size by 95%. However, our fixed effects structure controls 
for GUO-country and group characteristics. We discuss consequences of these research design choices in Section 
4.2. 
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|𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶|௦,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௦ + 𝛽ଶ𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௦,௧  + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆
+ 𝐹𝐸 + ε௦,௧ 
(3) 
where s and t index subsidiaries and years. |𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶|௦,௧  describes the absolute discretionary 
accruals of subsidiary s in year t, our measure of subsidiary earnings management (as discussed 
in Section 3.2 above). 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௦ equals one for our treated sample of subsidiaries with an 
initial PCAOB inspection of the GUO auditor. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௦,௧  equals one for 
subsidiaries in the first year following the final report of the initial PCAOB inspection of their 
GUO’s auditor, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽ଶ. It measures the treatment 
effect of initial PCAOB inspections at the GUO-auditor level on absolute discretionary accruals 
in the year after the inspection compared to all control observations. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 is a vector of 
control variables.  
Prior studies document size, profitability, growth, previous loss years, financial 
structure, and operating risk as possible determinants of earnings management (Beuselinck et 
al., 2018; Krishnan et al., 2017; Fung et al., 2017). Hribar and Nichols (2007) argue that cash 
flow volatility and turnover volatility as measures for operating risk are crucial for the analysis 
of absolute discretionary accruals. We include the logarithm of total assets (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), the absolute 
value of return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴), the absolute value of cash flow from operations scaled by total 
assets ( 𝐶𝐹𝑂 ), the percentage change in turnover compared to the previous year 
(𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻), an indicator variable that equals one for years following a loss year 
(𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆), total debt scaled by total assets (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸), the standard deviation of the cash flow 
from operations (𝑆𝐷_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ), and the standard deviation of turnover (𝑆𝐷_𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 ) as 
control variables. The Appendix contains detailed variable definitions.  
𝐹𝐸 is a vector of fixed effects. It includes year, subsidiary-industry, subsidiary-country, 
and GUO-country or group fixed effects. Prior literature on earnings management in the 
international context applies year, industry, and country fixed effects to control for 
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unobservable characteristics (Krishnan et al., 2017). In our setting, this translates into year, 
subsidiary-industry, and subsidiary-country fixed effects. As we analyze international 
subsidiaries with international ownership structures, we also include GUO-country or group 
fixed effects. First, we introduce GUO-country fixed effects to capture unobservable 
determinants of subsidiary earnings management arising from characteristics of the GUO 
country. Second, in our main regression model, we employ group fixed effects to control for 
unobservable characteristics within groups that could determine the earnings management of 
subsidiaries (Beuselinck et al., 2018). Group fixed effects include, but go beyond, a GUO’s 
country. We follow Beuselinck et al. (2018) and apply two-way clustering of standard errors at 
the subsidiary-country and at the subsidiary-industry as subsidiaries in the same country and 
industry can share common characteristics. 
3.4 Sample Construction 
Our sample construction follows four major steps. First, we define 324 initial foreign 
PCAOB inspections of non-U.S. auditors between 2009 and 2016. Second, we determine 583 
non-U.S. GUOs of multinational groups that are listed in the U.S. and for which Orbis allows 
to identify GUO-auditor data. To construct our treated sample, we combine these two datasets 
in step three. This results in 151 GUOs with 2,517 international subsidiaries that are affected 
by an initial PCAOB inspection of the GUO auditor. We allow initial PCAOB inspections of 
GUO auditors to trigger a subsidiary treatment only once in our sample period. If a subsidiary 
is defined as treated due to an initial PCAOB inspection of its GUO auditor, we do not define 
the same subsidiary as treated if the GUO replaces its auditor and the new auditor is initially 
PCAOB-inspected in a subsequent year.24 For our treatment sample, we construct a two-year 
window covering one year before and one year after the PCAOB inspection of the GUO auditor. 
                                                     
24 Including observations where GUOs are affected by multiple initial PCAOB inspections of their auditors would 
dilute the effect of initial PCAOB inspections due to the experience and adjustments of these GUOs following 
recurring PCAOB inspections of their auditors. 
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In step four, we construct our control group. To do so, we start with 27,199 international 
subsidiaries of groups with U.S.-listed GUOs and identifiable GUO-auditor data that did not 
have an initial PCAOB inspection of their GUO’s auditor before 2017. We retain subsidiary-
year observations in the country-industry-year combinations of treated subsidiaries and drop 
treated observations for which no control observations are available. This ensures that when we 
compare the treated and control groups, international subsidiaries in both groups share 
characteristics that could be important determinants of earnings management. After dropping 
observations with missing data for our main analysis, we retain 744 subsidiary-year 
observations for the treated group and 2,815 subsidiary-year observations for our control group. 
This results in 3,559 subsidiary-year observations for our final sample. 
In Table 1 Panel A, we present the distribution of subsidiary-year observations in the 
final sample across countries. Countries with the most observations are France (26.95% of all 
observations), Italy (13.82% of all observations), and the United Kingdom (10.51% of all 
observations). Table 1 Panel B presents the distribution of GUOs across countries. The most 
important GUO countries (in terms of observations) are Japan (40.99% of all observations), the 
United Kingdom (18.4% of all observations), and Switzerland (14.02% of all observations). In 
robustness tests, we exclude subsidiaries from major countries and subsidiaries with GUOs 
from major countries.25 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
We present descriptive statistics for the treated and control group as well as for the pre- 
and post-inspection year of the treated group in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized 
                                                     
25 In prior studies (see, e.g., Shroff et al., 2014; Bena et al., 2019; Beuselinck et al., 2018), up to 55% of the 
observations have a GUO from the U.S. As we analyze subsidiaries of foreign U.S.-listed GUOs, subsidiaries of 
U.S. GUOs are not in our sample. Due to missing public disclosure requirements for international subsidiaries 
located in the U.S., prior studies (see, e.g., Shroff et al., 2014; Bena et al., 2019; Beuselinck et al., 2018) include 
very few, if any, observations from international subsidiaries located in the U.S. in their samples (maximum 2.2% 
in Shroff et al., 2017). Therefore, the lack of international subsidiaries located in the U.S. in our sample is not 
surprising. 
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at the upper and lower 1% level of their distributions.26 Panel A presents descriptive statistics 
for the treated and control sample. The mean of absolute discretionary accruals is similar for 
both groups. Subsidiaries in the treated and control samples are comparable regarding size, cash 
flow from operations, financial structure, and operating risk. Subsidiaries in the treated sample 
are slightly more profitable and grow less than subsidiaries in the control sample. Overall, the 
comparison demonstrates that subsidiaries in the control and treatment groups are similar with 
regard to important characteristics for the determination of earnings management.  
We present descriptive statistics of the treated sample in the pre- and post-inspection 
year in Panel B of Table 2. The mean of absolute discretionary accruals decreases from the pre- 
to the post-inspection year with everything else except turnover growth remaining stable 
(turnover growth drops from the pre- to the post-inspection year). This could be an indicator 
for a decrease in earnings management of treated subsidiaries in the year after PCAOB 
inspections at the GUO-auditor level. To analyze this further, we include the control group and 
estimate regression (3). We present and discuss the results of these estimations in the next 
section. 
4 Results 
4.1 Main Result  
We estimate regression (3) to test hypothesis H1. As discussed above, treated firms are 
international subsidiaries of foreign U.S.-listed GUOs whose auditor is initially PCAOB-
inspected during our sample period. Control firms are international subsidiaries of foreign U.S.-
listed GUOs with no initial PCAOB inspection of their GUO auditors before or during our 
sample period. The subsidiary observations in the control group are required to be in the same 
                                                     
26 Alternatively, we truncate all continuous variables at the upper and lower 1% level of their distributions in 
unreported analyses. The canon of our main results is unchanged. 
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country-industry-year combinations as treated subsidiaries’ observations. We present 
regression results in Table 3. 
The coefficient on POST_INSPECTION is significantly negative in model (1). It 
measures the effect of initial GUO-auditor level PCAOB inspections on absolute discretionary 
accruals in the year after the inspection compared to all control observations. Therefore, the 
estimate indicates a decrease in absolute discretionary accruals at international subsidiaries after 
PCAOB inspections of their GUO’s auditor. This result leads us to reject hypothesis H1 as the 
estimation documents a significant effect of initial PCAOB inspections concerning GUO 
auditors on earning management practices of international subsidiaries. Model (1) employs 
year, subsidiary-industry, subsidiary-country, and GUO-country fixed effects. This allows us 
to control for unobservable subsidiary-year, subsidiary-industry, subsidiary-country, and GUO-
country determinants of subsidiary-level earnings management. Prior literature on earnings 
management in the international context applies year, industry, and country fixed effects to 
control for unobservable factors (see, e.g., Krishnan et al., 2017). As Beuselinck et al. (2018) 
provide descriptive evidence for a correlation between GUO-country characteristics and 
international subsidiary earnings management, it is important to include GUO-country fixed 
effects due to the international ownership structures of the subsidiaries in our sample.  
We next control for subsidiary characteristics in model (2). Even when controlling for 
subsidiary-level determinants of earnings management, the estimated coefficient on 
POST_INSPECTION still remains negative and significant with similar size as in model (1). 
Consequently, the effect indicated by model (1) does not seem to be brought about by 
subsidiary-level determinants of earnings management, as the coefficient on 
POST_INSPECTION is robust against the inclusion of subsidiary characteristics as control 
variables. Consistent with prior studies, the regression estimates document that subsidiaries that 
are smaller, have higher cash flows from operations, larger growth, prior losses, and higher 
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operating risk tend to have higher absolute discretionary accruals (see, e.g., Beuselinck et al., 
2018). 
We replace GUO-country fixed effects by group fixed effects in model (3) and (4). 
Beuselinck et al. (2018) provide evidence for a correlation between group characteristics and 
international subsidiary earnings management. The coefficient on POST_INSPECTION 
remains negative and significant for the estimate in model (3) with no control variables. While 
GUO-country fixed effects only control for unobservable GUO-country characteristics, group 
fixed effects control for various time-invariant GUO level determinants of subsidiary earnings 
management. Even with these stricter fixed effects, the coefficient on POST_INSPECTION 
continues to be negative and significant with comparable size as in model (1). 
The coefficient on POST_INSPECTION remains negative and significant with similar 
size if we include subsidiary characteristics as control variables in model (4). The coefficients 
of the control variables document similar results as in model (2), except for the insignificant 
coefficient of LOSS. 
The estimated coefficient on POST_INSPECTION is significant at the 5% level 
throughout all models. The coefficient ranges between -0.0683 and -0.0781 in the estimations 
of Table 3. The standard deviation of absolute discretionary accruals for treated subsidiaries in 
the pre-inspection period is 0.393. Hence, the estimates indicate an average decline by 17.38% 
to 19.87% of the pre-inspection standard deviation in the post-inspection year, which implies 
not only a statistically but also an economically significant decrease in absolute discretionary 
accruals of international subsidiaries after initial PCAOB inspections of GUO auditors. 
These results allow us to reject hypothesis H1 as we find an economically and 
statistically significant effect of initial PCAOB inspections regarding auditors of foreign U.S.-
listed GUOs on international subsidiary earnings management. All four models in Table 3 
document a decrease in absolute discretionary accruals compared to same country-industry-
year observations of subsidiaries with non-U.S. GUOs that are also U.S.-listed but do not have 
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a PCAOB-inspected auditor. Our findings suggest a transmission of PCAOB inspections within 
multinational business groups. We provide evidence for the cross-border influence of the 
PCAOB and show benefits for firms neither directly audited by the PCAOB-inspected 
accounting firms nor under the regulations assessed by the PCAOB during inspections. 
Additionally, we document a transmission effect of an event at the GUO level (i.e. initial 
PCAOB inspection of the GUO auditor) on the accounting discretion executed in international 
subsidiaries. This effect could arise from GUO-level pressure to adjust subsidiaries’ earnings 
management with increased audit quality at the GUO level.  
4.2 Identification Analysis 
To empirically identify the effect of PCAOB inspections on international subsidiaries, 
our research design needs to mitigate the empirical concern of omitted variables.  
Our control group construction and our fixed effects structure design aim to isolate the 
effect of an initial PCAOB inspection of the GUO auditor. We compare subsidiary earnings 
management in the year following an inspection of the GUO’s auditor to subsidiary earnings 
management of control subsidiaries in the same years. We also require that the control 
subsidiary-observations are from the same industry and from the same country as the treated 
subsidiary-observations. Requiring control subsidiaries to be in the same subsidiary countries 
and subsidiary industries as treated subsidiaries ensures that differences at the subsidiary-
country and subsidiary-industry level (which could influence subsidiaries’ reactions to GUO-
level events) do not drive our results. Similarly, requiring control observations from the same 
years as treated observations controls for possible time trends in the impact of GUO-level 
events on international subsidiaries.  
In addition to the strict requirements for control observations, our empirical estimation 
also uses an extensive fixed effects structure. The fixed effects ensure that our results are not 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277474 
25 
 
driven by unobservable variables specific to a subsidiary country, a subsidiary industry, a year, 
or a GUO country or group.  
In spite of our control group and fixed effects, omitted variables that correlate with both 
PCAOB inspections and subsidiary earnings management could still raise concerns of 
alternative explanations for our results. The PCAOB could potentially consider GUO 
characteristics such as GUO earnings management incentives as red flags and, based on these, 
decide to inspect GUO auditors. Such GUO characteristics could correlate with subsidiary 
earnings management and hence give rise to an omitted variable bias.  
We first note that PCAOB inspections primarily focus on auditors and their audit quality 
but not audit clients of these auditors. Therefore, a correlation between GUO characteristics 
and PCAOB inspections seems unlikely. Nevertheless, to further mitigate this concern, we 
consider (and try to control for) three types of GUO characteristics: time-invariant GUO 
characteristics, GUO earnings management incentives, and GUO characteristics potentially 
correlated with high subsidiary earnings management. 
We control for time-invariant GUO characteristics by including group fixed effects in 
our main model. As long as time-invariant GUO characteristics could influence both the 
likelihood of an auditor’s PCAOB inspection and subsidiary-level earnings management, these 
fixed effects control for the effect of such characteristics. Beuselinck et al. (2018) provide 
evidence for a correlation between time-varying GUO earnings management incentives and 
subsidiary earnings management. At the same time, one could argue that the PCAOB might 
consider earnings management incentives of audit clients for the selection of auditors that are 
inspected. Therefore, we control for GUO earnings management incentives in additional tests 
discussed in Section 4.4.1. The canon of our main result remains robust.  
The significantly positive coefficient on INSPECTION in model (1), (2), and (4) of 
Table 3 could raise further concerns of omitted variables. This coefficient measures the 
difference in subsidiary earnings management between treated observations in the pre-
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inspection period and all control observations. The coefficient indicates higher subsidiary 
earnings management of treated firms prior to inspections. Should higher subsidiary earnings 
management be correlated with a GUO characteristic that could trigger an inspection of the 
GUO auditor, this could result in an omitted variable bias. To mitigate this concern, we perform 
an additional analysis with a propensity-score matched control sample matched on pre-
inspection subsidiary earnings management, size, profitability, growth, previous loss years, 
financial structure, and operating risk. This construction aims to mitigate pre-inspection 
differences in subsidiary earnings management and its determinants between treated and control 
observations. To this end, we only keep nearest neighbors of treated subsidiaries and require 
that at least two potential matches are available. Unreported regression analyses estimate 
insignificant coefficients on INSPECTION and hence indicate no difference between pre-
inspection subsidiary earnings management of treated subsidiaries and all control observations 
in the propensity-score matched sample. As coefficients on POST_INSPECTION remain 
significantly negative, unreported estimates mitigate concerns regarding GUO characteristics 
that correlate with high pre-inspection subsidiary earnings management and trigger PCAOB 
inspections of GUO auditors.  
Overall, our strict requirements for the control group, the use of a tight fixed effects 
structure, and the inclusion of control variables mitigate concerns regarding alternative 
explanations of our findings (i.e. non-initial GUO auditor-PCAOB inspection-related). For 
correlated omitted variables to still be a concern, time-variant GUO characteristics would have 
to be correlated with subsidiary earnings management and PCAOB inspection decisions, not be 
correlated with time-variant GUO earnings management incentives, and not be captured in our 
propensity-score matched sample. Therefore, we are confident that our research design is going 
some way towards allowing for a causal interpretation of the transmission effect of initial 
PCAOB inspections of GUO auditors on international subsidiaries. 
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4.3 Further Analysis 
Some countries prohibit PCAOB inspections of auditors located in their jurisdictions. 
Literature provides evidence that audit quality of U.S.-listed firms increases if PCAOB 
inspections are permitted (see, e.g., Lamoreaux, 2016; Song and Sun, 2017; He, Li, Liu, and 
Pittman, 2019). PCAOB access in a country could influence the reaction of a subsidiary to the 
initial PCAOB inspection of its GUO auditor. On the one hand, the effect on subsidiaries that 
are located in countries with PCAOB access could be larger due to a higher awareness of 
PCAOB inspections in the country. On the other hand, a larger effect could be expected for 
subsidiaries that are located in countries with no PCAOB access as firms’ awareness of PCAOB 
inspections is low. A larger effect could arise from higher potential for improvements in these 
countries. 
We define countries where PCAOB inspections are permitted or prohibited and replace 
POST_INSPECTION by POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS and 
POST_INSPECTION_X_NO_ACCESS to test this empirically. 27 
POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS equals one for treated subsidiaries in the post-inspection 
year if the subsidiary country permits PCAOB inspections, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
POST_INSPECTION_X_NO_ACCESS equals one for treated subsidiaries in the post-
inspection year if the subsidiary country prohibits PCAOB inspections, and zero otherwise. 
Table 4 provides regression results. While model (1) presents regression results without 
control variables, we include control variables in model (2). The coefficient on 
POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS is negative and significant in both models. In model (1), the 
coefficient on POST_INSPECTION_X_NO_ACCESS is negative and significant, whereas it is 
positive and insignificant in model (2). These results indicate a larger effect on earnings 
management of subsidiaries that are located in countries with PCAOB access. This 
                                                     
27 We obtain information on PCAOB access in countries from the official PCAOB website on international 
PCAOB inspections (https://pcaobus.org/International/Pages/default.aspx). 
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interpretation is corroborated as the coefficients on POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS and 
POST_INSPECTION_X_NO_ACCESS are significantly different in both models (p-value 
(model (1)): 0.02, p-value (model (2)): 0.01). Moreover, the estimated negative coefficient on 
POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS is 15% stronger than in the comparable main model. The 
stronger effect in subsidiary countries that allow PCAOB access could be driven by higher 
awareness of PCAOB inspections in these countries compared to countries that do not allow 
PCAOB access. Due to this higher awareness, an inspection at the GUO-auditor level could 
result in stronger reactions. 
4.4 Robustness Tests 
4.4.1 GUO Earnings Management Incentives 
Literature finds that GUO earnings management incentives can determine international 
subsidiary earnings management (see, e.g., Beuselinck et al., 2018). GUO earnings 
management incentives can be both observable and unobservable. Observable characteristics 
are “Big Four” GUO auditors, small gains at the GUO level, financial situations of the GUO, 
and differences in corporate tax rates between the subsidiary and GUO country. Unobservable 
differences between the GUO country and subsidiary country could correlate with GUO 
earnings management incentives. We extend our baseline model with control variables for these 
observable and unobservable characteristics. 
First, firms audited by accounting firms of the “Big Four” group are less likely to engage 
in earnings management (see, e.g., Fung et al., 2017; Krishnan et al., 2017). Bishop, 
Hermanson, and Houston (2013) document that audit deficiencies are less likely for clients of 
“Big Four” auditors. Consequently, GUOs audited by “Big Four” accounting firms could 
influence subsidiary managers to adjust the degree of earnings management. We include the 
indicator variable GUO_BIG4_AUDITOR that is coded one if the GUO is audited by KPMG, 
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PwC, Ernst & Young, or Deloitte, and zero otherwise.28 Results are reported in model (1) of 
Table 5 Panel A. The coefficient on POST_INSPECTION remains significant and negative with 
similar size as in the baseline model. The coefficient on GUO_BIG4_AUDITOR is significantly 
negative, indicating a lower degree of subsidiary earnings management if GUOs are audited by 
“Big Four” auditors.  
Second, Beuselinck et al. (2018) document a positive relation between GUO earnings 
management incentives related to the financial situation of the GUO and subsidiary earnings 
management. We include two measures to capture incentives of GUOs to influence subsidiary 
earnings management that are related to the financial situation of the GUO. First, firms 
reporting small gains are more likely to have managed earnings (see, e.g., Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999). Hence, GUOs with small gains could 
influence subsidiary managers to increase earnings management with the intention to boost 
consolidated profits in the intended direction. Therefore, we construct the indicator variable 
GUO_SMALL_GAIN that is set to one if consolidated GUO net profits are lower than 1% of 
consolidated total assets. The second measure captures financial constraints of the GUO. Prior 
literature documents an increase in earnings management if firms face the requirement to 
finance operating activities with new capital. GUO_FIN_CONSTRAINTS is an indicator 
variable coded one if the GUO consolidated cash flow scaled by current assets at the beginning 
of the year is less than -0.5.29 
We present the regression estimates with control variables for GUO earnings 
management incentives measured by small gains and financial constraints in models (2) and (3) 
of Table 5 Panel A. The coefficient on POST_INSPECTION remains negative and significant 
throughout both models. The coefficient on GUO_SMALL_GAIN is not significant. The 
                                                     
28 We define all affiliates of “Big Four” firms as such auditors. This applies to different legal entities across 
countries, e.g. Ernst & Young AG in Switzerland and Ernst & Young S.L. in Spain, as well as to legal entities 
within a country, e.g. KPMG Audit Plc. and KPMG LLP in the UK.  
29 We follow Beuselinck et al. (2018) for the construction using Orbis and Beuselinck et al. (2018) and Degeorge 
et al. (1999) for the definition. 
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coefficient on GUO_FIN_CONSTRAINTS is significant and positive, indicating a positive 
relation between GUO financial constraints and subsidiary earnings management.  
Third, literature provides evidence that multinational business groups shift profits if 
corporate tax rates vary across countries of group members (see, e.g., Beer and Loeprick, 2013; 
De Simone, 2016). Hence, the difference in tax rates between the GUO country and the 
subsidiary country could determine GUO incentives to manage earnings of international 
subsidiaries. Therefore, we control for the difference in tax rates by D_TAX.30 Model (4) of 
Table 5 Panel A presents regression results controlling for the difference in tax rates. The 
coefficient on POST_INSPECTION remains significantly negative. The coefficient on D_TAX 
is not significant.  
We also include all observable GUO incentive variables (as discussed above) in one 
model and present results in model (5) of Table 5 Panel A. The coefficient on 
POST_INSPECTION remains negative and significant. These findings indicate that our main 
result does not seem to be driven by GUO earnings management incentives. 
Finally, as we already control for group fixed effects in our baseline model, concerns 
regarding time-invariant unobservable GUO characteristics that could drive our results are 
mitigated. However, unobservable differences between the GUO country and the subsidiary 
country could correlate with GUO earnings management incentives. For instance, regulation 
differences between the GUO country and the subsidiary country could result in lower earnings 
management at the GUO level and higher earnings management at the subsidiary level, or vice 
versa. In untabulated robustness tests, we introduce subsidiary-GUO country-pair fixed effects 
to capture these unobservable differences between each subsidiary-country and GUO-country 
combination. The canon of our main results remain robust. In addition, prior studies suggest 
                                                     
30  We employ tax rates from the KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Table (https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/ 
home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html) to construct the 
difference in corporate tax rates between GUO and subsidiary countries. 
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that clients of PCAOB-inspected auditors increase investments and change their capital 
structure (Shroff, 2017). To test whether such changes drive our results, we interact leverage 
and investment measures of GUOs and subsidiaries with INSPECTION and 
POST_INSPECTION. Our result remains robust when we control for these interaction terms in 
untabulated robustness tests.  
4.4.2 Exclusion of Observations from Major Countries 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution across countries. While 27% of the observations 
are from subsidiaries located in France, the second most popular country in our sample is Italy 
(14%). 41% of the subsidiary-year observations have a GUO from Japan, 18% from the United 
Kingdom. The distribution across subsidiary countries and GUO countries could raise concerns 
that individual countries where many subsidiaries or GUOs are located drive our findings. To 
mitigate this concern, we drop observations from the country with the most subsidiary-year 
observations (France) and show regression results in models (1) and (2) of Table 5 Panel B. We 
present results of the sample without subsidiary observations that have a GUO from the country 
with most GUOs (Japan) in models (3) and (4). The coefficient on POST_INSPECTION 
remains negative and significant with comparable size as in the main model if we exclude 
subsidiary-year observations from France (this procedure excludes 27% of observations). If we 
drop subsidiary-year observations with GUOs from Japan, the sample decreases by roughly 
41%. The coefficient on POST_INSPECTION still remains significantly negative, while the 
size of the indicated effect is slightly smaller than in our main model.31 
Orbis collects financial information from various sources such as financial statement 
filings, securities commissions, and further data providers. This approach could induce an 
                                                     
31 Alternatively, we exclude subsidiaries from Italy and GUOs from the United Kingdom in separate analyses. In 
addition, we exclude subsidiaries from both France and Italy as well as subsidiaries with GUOs from both Japan 
and the United Kingdom in separate analyses. The coefficient on POST_INSPECTION remains significantly 
negative throughout these tests. 
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overrepresentation of countries requiring limited liability companies to file financial reports 
(e.g. European Union members), while countries that do not require filings of limited liability 
firms (e.g. Canada) could be underrepresented (Beuselinck et al., 2018). Consequently, a 
potential concern is that this approach influences the inferences of our findings as subsidiaries 
from countries that do not require limited liability companies to file financial reports could 
dilute the results. To mitigate this concern, we first only keep European subsidiaries in 
untabulated robustness tests. Second, we also require that their GUOs are European. 
Alternatively, we exclude subsidiaries from Canada or subsidiaries with GUOs from Canada in 
untabulated analyses.32 The canon of our main analysis remains robust throughout these tests. 
4.4.3 Validation of Earnings Management Measure 
Chen, Hribar, and Melessa (2018) raise concerns related to two-stage regressions that 
use residuals as dependent variables. As we construct our earnings management proxy by using 
a two-stage regression approach, their concerns also apply to the construction of our measure. 
To mitigate the concern that our design generates biased coefficients, we follow Chen et al. 
(2018) and include the control variables applied in the first-stage regression to determine 
discretionary accruals from residuals (regression (1)) in the second-stage regression (regression 
(3)). We do not include the control variable for total assets as we already control for size in the 
baseline regression. Regression results are presented in model (1) of Table 5 Panel C. The 
coefficient on POST_INSPECTION remains negative and significant.  
For our main earnings management measure, we pool regressions to determine residuals 
that proxy for discretionary accruals across years and subsidiary industries, where industries 
are defined by the primary two-digit NACE Rev. 2 code. To test our baseline definition of 
                                                     
32 This approach also mitigates concerns regarding Canada’s proximity to the U.S. that could result in higher 
awareness of the PCAOB in Canada than in other countries. As our result is robust against excluding subsidiaries 
from Canada or subsidiaries with Canadian GUOs, the danger that these subsidiaries drive our results through a 
larger effect of inspections resulting from higher PCAOB awareness, is limited. 
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earnings management, we alternatively pool regressions across years, subsidiary industries, and 
subsidiary countries (|DACCC|). We define industries by the primary NACE Rev. 2 section for 
this approach. We follow Beuselinck et al. (2018) by decreasing the number of industry 
clusters.33 The choice of whether to pool regressions across subsidiary countries is a trade-off 
between capturing country characteristics and considering a low number of firms for the 
estimation regressions. Through the application of a broader industry classification, the 
approach captures country characteristics while the cost of losing observations from country-
industry groups is decreased. Regression results are presented in model (2) of Table 5 Panel C. 
The coefficient on POST_INSPECTION continues to be significantly negative. Note that we 
classify subsidiary industries by the primary NACE Rev. 2 section for fixed effects and standard 
error clustering in model (2), according to the different earnings management construction. 
5 Conclusion 
Prior studies document an improvement in audit quality after initial international 
PCAOB inspections of auditors (see, e.g., Krishnan et al., 2017). However, it is unclear if this 
improvement transmits through multinational business groups. Our study investigates the effect 
of an initial GUO-auditor PCAOB inspection on international subsidiaries. Our results provide 
evidence of a decrease in earnings management of international subsidiaries in years following 
the initial PCAOB inspection of their U.S.-listed GUO’s non-U.S. auditor. In doing so, we also 
document an additional dimension of international benefits arising from foreign PCAOB 
inspections. Fung et al. (2017) document an improvement in audit quality for non-U.S.-listed 
public firms following the initial PCAOB inspection of their non-U.S. auditor. Our findings 
                                                     
33 Beuselinck et al. (2018) apply the Campbell (1996) industry classification. As we define subsidiary industries 
by NACE codes, we cannot adopt the Campbell (1996) twelve industries that are defined based on SIC codes. 
Therefore, we classify industries by their primary NACE Rev. 2 sections. This results in 21 different industry 
classifications. 
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provide evidence for international benefits of foreign PCAOB inspections beyond the country 
of the inspected auditor. 
An advantage of our research setting is the staggered nature of initial international 
PCAOB inspections over years, countries, and auditors. Additionally, we require our control 
group to share various crucial characteristics with treated subsidiaries and control for subsidiary 
and GUO characteristics that determine earnings management by using control variables and a 
strict fixed effects structure. These research design choices thus mitigate concerns of 
contemporaneous events driving our results. 
While prior research documents an improvement in audit quality for clients after initial 
PCAOB inspections, we argue that the effect on international subsidiary earnings management 
is not obvious. International subsidiaries are not the primary target of foreign PCAOB 
inspections, as inspections focus on auditors of U.S.-listed firms and aim to improve audit 
quality of U.S.-listed companies. Hence, it is a priori unclear if GUOs shift earnings 
management to international subsidiaries or if GUOs require international subsidiaries to adjust 
earnings management policies with the increased audit quality at the consolidated accounts 
level.  
One caveat to note is that we cannot require subsidiaries in the control group to have 
GUOs from the same country and industry as treated subsidiaries. This requirement would 
decrease the sample size by roughly 95%. However, our tight control group construction, our 
strict fixed effects structure, and the PCAOB inspection schedule mitigate the concern of 
alternative explanations of our results arising from this design choice. Our findings suggest that 
foreign PCAOB inspections have benefits over and above the positive effects on financial 
statements of U.S.-listed and non-U.S.-listed firms that are audited by inspected audit firms and 
located in the country of inspected auditors. The results are of potential interest to the PCAOB 
and national regulators as we document international benefits of foreign PCAOB inspections 
across borders.   
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition Sources 
   
Main Variables  
 
 
|DACC| Absolute value of discretionary 
accruals measured by a 
performance-adjusted modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al., 
1995; Kothari et al., 2005), 
pooled across industries (primary 
two-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes) 
and years. 
 
Orbis, IMF 
World 
Economic 
Outlook 
INSPECTION Indicator variable set to one if the 
auditor of the GUO is PCAOB-
inspected in the sample period 
(treatment group), zero 
otherwise. 
 
Orbis, PCAOB 
official website 
POST_INSPECTION Indicator variable set to one in the 
year following a PCAOB 
inspection (treatment group) of 
the GUO auditor, zero otherwise. 
 
Orbis, PCAOB 
official website 
   
Control Variables  
 
 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Orbis 
ROA Return on assets, measured as the 
absolute value of net income 
before extraordinary items scaled 
by total assets. If Orbis provides 
no information on extraordinary 
items, we assume an amount of 
zero. 
 
Orbis 
CFO Cash flow from operations, 
measured as the absolute value of 
the delta between net income 
before extraordinary items and 
total accruals scaled by total 
assets. If Orbis provides no 
information on extraordinary 
items, we assume an amount of 
zero. 
 
Orbis 
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Appendix (continued) 
 
Variable 
 
Definition Sources 
Control Variables (continued) 
 
 
TURNOVER_GROWTH Percentage change in turnover from 
year t-1 to t. 
 
Orbis 
LOSS Indicator variable set to one if the 
subsidiary generated a loss in the 
previous year. 
 
Orbis 
LEVERAGE Leverage measured as total debt 
(long-term debt and short-term 
debt) scaled by total assets. 
 
Orbis 
SD_CFO Standard deviation of cash flow 
from operations of the previous 
three years. 
 
Orbis 
SD_TURNOVER Standard deviation of turnover of 
the previous three years. 
 
Orbis 
   
Additional Variables 
 
 
GUO_BIG4_AUDITOR Indicator variable set to one for 
subsidiaries with a GUO that is 
audited by KPMG, PwC, Ernst & 
Young, or Deloitte, zero otherwise. 
 
Orbis 
GUO_SMALL_GAIN Indicator variable set to one if the 
GUO reports a net profit in the 
consolidated financial statement 
that is less than 1% of total assets, 
zero otherwise. 
 
Orbis 
GUO_FIN_CONSTRAINTS Indicator variable set to one if the 
ratio of GUO consolidated cash 
flow and current assets at the 
beginning of the year is less than -
0.5. 
 
Orbis 
D_TAX Difference in the corporate tax rate 
between the GUO and subsidiary 
country. 
 
KPMG 
Corporate Tax 
Rates Table 
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Appendix (continued) 
  
Variable 
 
Definition Sources 
Additional Variables (continued) 
 
 
REV_REC_TA 
 
 
Difference between the change in 
revenues and receivables from 
year t-1 to t scaled by total assets. 
Orbis 
   
L_ROA Return on Assets in year t-1. Orbis 
   
L_INFLATION 
 
 
Inflation in year t-1. IMF World 
Economic 
Outlook 
   
L_GDP_GROWTH 
 
 
Change in real purchasing power 
based GDP from year t-2 to t-1. 
IMF World 
Economic 
Outlook 
   
|DACCc| Absolute discretionary accruals 
measured by a performance-
adjusted modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et 
al., 2005), pooled across 
countries, industries (NACE 
Rev. 2 sections) and years. 
 
Orbis, IMF 
World 
Economic 
Outlook 
 
 
 
POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS Indicator variable set to one in 
years following a PCAOB 
inspection (treatment group) of 
the GUO auditor if the country of 
the international subsidiary 
permits PCAOB inspections, 
zero otherwise. 
 
PCAOB 
official 
website 
POST_INSPECTION_X_NO_ACCESS Indicator variable set to one in 
years following a PCAOB 
inspection (treatment group) of 
the GUO auditor if the country of 
the international subsidiary 
prohibits PCAOB inspections, 
zero otherwise. 
 
PCAOB 
official 
website 
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution across Countries 
Panel A: Distribution of Subsidiaries across Countries 
Country Subsidiary-Year Observations % 
Australia 32 0.90 
Austria 13 0.37 
Belgium 246 6.91 
Bulgaria 16 0.45 
Croatia 18 0.51 
Czech Republic 74 2.08 
Finland 22 0.62 
France 959 26.95 
Germany 257 7.22 
Greece 37 1.04 
Hungary 29 0.81 
India 65 1.83 
Ireland 12 0.34 
Italy 492 13.82 
Korea (Republic of) 150 4.21 
Morocco 8 0.22 
Norway 138 3.88 
Philippines 8 0.22 
Poland 10 0.28 
Portugal 80 2.25 
Romania 23 0.65 
Serbia 7 0.20 
Slovakia 38 1.07 
Slovenia 21 0.59 
Spain 346 9.72 
Sweden 84 2.36 
United Kingdom 374 10.51 
Total 3,559 100.00 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Distribution of GUOs across Countries 
Country Subsidiary-Year Observations % 
Australia 30 0.84 
Austria 6 0.17 
Canada 298 8.37 
China 7 0.2 
Finland 101 2.84 
France 67 1.88 
Ireland 63 1.77 
Israel 66 1.85 
Italy 12 0.34 
Japan 1,459 40.99 
Luxembourg 12 0.34 
Netherlands 149 4.19 
Singapore 4 0.11 
South Africa 31 0.87 
Spain 44 1.24 
Sweden 56 1.57 
Switzerland 499 14.02 
United Kingdom 655 18.40 
Total 3,559 100.00 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of subsidiary countries and GUO countries of the subsidiary-year observations in 
the final sample. International subsidiaries are treated if the auditor of their foreign U.S.-listed GUO is initially 
PCAOB-inspected during our sample period. We retain observations of international subsidiaries for the control 
group if they are in the country-industry-year combinations of treated observations. We require control subsidiaries 
to have a foreign U.S.-listed GUO whose auditor is not initially PCAOB-inspected before or during our sample 
period. We define a GUO as firm that directly or indirectly holds at least 50.01% in a subsidiary and is itself not 
owned by a single corporate shareholder by more than 25% or by a single non-corporate shareholder by more than 
50%. The GUOs of subsidiaries in our sample are U.S.-listed but not located in the U.S. Table 1 Panel A presents 
the distribution of subsidiary countries of the subsidiary-year observations. Table 1 Panel B presents the 
distribution of GUO countries of the subsidiary-year observations. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Treated and Control Subsidiaries 
 Treated  Control         
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.   N Mean Std. Dev. 
|DACC| 744 0.2111 0.3302  2,815 0.2074 0.2968 
SIZE 744 10.3642 1.8913  2,815 9.9763 1.8898 
ROA 744 0.0884 0.1161  2,815 0.0996 0.1296 
CFO 744 0.1789 0.2100  2,815 0.1854 0.2244 
TURNOVER_GROWTH 744 0.0675 0.4811  2,815 0.0811 0.4817 
LOSS 744 0.2460 0.4309  2,815 0.2348 0.4240 
LEVERAGE 744 0.3090 0.2936  2,815 0.2799 0.2782 
SD_CFO 744 0.2451 0.2610  2,815 0.2264 0.2245 
SD_TURNOVER 744 0.4959 0.6106  2,815 0.5086 0.6398 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Treated Subsidiaries in the Pre- and Post-Inspection Period 
 Pre-Inspection  Post-Inspection         
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.   N Mean Std. Dev. 
|DACC| 372 0.2483 0.3930  372 0.1740 0.2473 
SIZE 372 10.3837 1.8699  372 10.3447 1.9147 
ROA 372 0.0882 0.1123  372 0.0885 0.1200 
CFO 372 0.1871 0.2100  372 0.1707 0.2099 
TURNOVER_GROWTH 372 0.0903 0.5341  372 0.0447 0.4211 
LOSS 372 0.2608 0.4396  372 0.2312 0.4222 
LEVERAGE 372 0.3169 0.2878  372 0.3012 0.2995 
SD_CFO 372 0.2401 0.2671  372 0.2501 0.2551 
SD_TURNOVER 372 0.4722 0.5536  372 0.5196 0.6627 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. International subsidiaries are treated if the auditor of their foreign U.S.-
listed GUO is initially PCAOB-inspected during our sample period. We retain observations of international 
subsidiaries for the control group if they are in the country-industry-year combinations of treated observations. 
We require control subsidiaries to have a foreign U.S.-listed GUO whose auditor is not initially PCAOB-inspected 
before or during our sample period. |DACC| denotes the absolute value of discretionary accruals. SIZE denotes the 
natural logarithm of total assets. ROA measures the absolute value of return on assets, CFO the absolute value of 
cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, and TURNOVER_GROWTH the percentage change in turnover 
compared to the previous year. LOSS is an indicator variable that equals one for years following a loss year. 
LEVERAGE denotes the ratio of total debt scaled by total assets. SD_CFO and SD_TURNOVER denote the 
standard deviation of the cash flow from operations and turnover. Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics 
of treated and control subsidiaries. Table 2 Panel B shows descriptive statistics of treated subsidiaries in the pre-
inspection and post-inspection period. All continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 1% level of 
their distributions. 
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Table 3 
Absolute Discretionary Accruals Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  |DACC| |DACC| |DACC| |DACC| 
INSPECTION 0.0288** 0.0418** 0.0296 0.0702** 
 (2.240) (2.393) (0.997) (2.171) 
POST_INSPECTION -0.0781** -0.0756** -0.0736** -0.0683** 
 (-2.335) (-2.236) (-2.333) (-2.079) 
SIZE  -0.00770***  -0.00995*** 
  (-3.146)  (-2.870) 
ROA  -0.0427  -0.0941 
  (-0.436)  (-1.378) 
CFO  0.512***  0.529*** 
  (17.13)  (15.99) 
TURNOVER_GROWTH  0.107***  0.104*** 
  (6.481)  (5.901) 
LOSS  0.0270*  0.0251 
  (1.716)  (1.288) 
LEVERAGE  0.00447  0.0201 
  (0.171)  (0.715) 
SD_CFO  0.142***  0.159*** 
  (6.538)  (5.094) 
SD_TURNOVER  0.0289***  0.0200* 
  (2.792)  (1.793) 
     
Observations 3,559 3,559 3,559 3,559 
R-squared 0.133 0.358 0.211 0.413 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GUO-Country FE Yes Yes No No 
Group FE No No Yes Yes 
SE Clustering Subsidiary-Country & Subsidiary-Industry 
 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the regressions on absolute discretionary accruals (|DACC|). International 
subsidiaries are treated if the auditor of their foreign U.S.-listed GUO is initially PCAOB-inspected during our 
sample period. We retain observations of international subsidiaries for the control group if they are in the country-
industry-year combinations of treated observations. We require control subsidiaries to have a foreign U.S.-listed 
GUO whose auditor is not initially PCAOB-inspected before or during our sample period. INSPECTION equals 
one for our treated sample of subsidiaries with an initial PCAOB inspection of their GUO auditor, and zero 
otherwise. POST_INSPECTION equals one for the first year following the final report year of the initial PCAOB 
inspection of a GUO’s auditor, and zero otherwise. SIZE denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA 
measures the absolute value of return on assets, CFO the absolute value of cash flow from operations scaled by 
total assets, and TURNOVER_GROWTH the percentage change in turnover compared to the previous year. LOSS 
is an indicator variable that equals one for years following a loss year. LEVERAGE denotes the ratio of total debt 
scaled by total assets. SD_CFO and SD_TURNOVER denote the standard deviation of the cash flow from 
operations and turnover. We include year, subsidiary-industry (primary two-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes), and 
subsidiary-country fixed effects in all models. Additionally, models (1) and (2) employ GUO-country fixed effects 
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and models (3) and (4) group fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary-country and subsidiary-
industry level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 1% level of their distributions. t-
statistics are presented in parentheses and calculated based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277474 
47 
 
Table 4 
Further Analysis: PCAOB Access in Subsidiary Countries 
  (1) (2) 
  |DACC| |DACC| 
INSPECTION 0.0299 0.0706** 
 (1.001) (2.201) 
POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS -0.0819** -0.0786** 
 (-2.387) (-2.255) 
POST_INSPECTION_X_NO_ACCESS -0.0128* 0.00676 
 (-1.962) (0.553) 
SIZE  -0.0101*** 
  (-2.916) 
ROA  -0.0959 
  (-1.421) 
CFO  0.529*** 
  (16.00) 
TURNOVER_GROWTH  0.104*** 
  (5.932) 
LOSS  0.0252 
  (1.230) 
LEVERAGE  0.0200 
  (0.706) 
SD_CFO  0.159*** 
  (5.141) 
SD_TURNOVER  0.0198* 
  (1.795) 
   
Observations 3,559 3,559 
R-squared 0.211 0.413 
Year FE Yes 
Subsidiary-Industry FE Yes 
Subsidiary-Country FE Yes 
Group FE Yes 
SE Clustering Subsidiary-Country & 
Subsidiary-Industry 
Model (1): Test for differences POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS & 
POST_INSPECTION_X_NO_ACCESS (t-statistic): 6.04 
Model (2): Test for differences POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS & 
POST_INSPECTION_X_NO_ACCESS (t-statistic): 8.50 
 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the regressions on absolute discretionary accruals (|DACC|) while considering 
whether PCAOB inspections are permitted in subsidiary countries. International subsidiaries are treated if the 
auditor of their foreign U.S.-listed GUO is initially PCAOB-inspected during our sample period. We retain 
observations of international subsidiaries for the control group if they are in the country-industry-year 
combinations of treated observations. We require control subsidiaries to have a foreign U.S.-listed GUO whose 
auditor is not initially PCAOB-inspected before or during our sample period. INSPECTION equals one for our 
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treated sample of subsidiaries with an initial PCAOB inspection of their GUO auditor, and zero otherwise. 
POST_INSPECTION_X_ACCESS equals one for the first year following the final report year of the initial PCAOB 
inspection of a GUO’s auditor if PCAOB inspections are permitted in the subsidiary country, and zero otherwise. 
POST_INSPECTION_X_NO_ACCESS equals one for the first year following the final report year of the initial 
PCAOB inspection of a GUO’s auditor if PCAOB inspections are prohibited in the subsidiary country, and zero 
otherwise. SIZE denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA measures the absolute value of return on assets, 
CFO the absolute value of cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, and TURNOVER_GROWTH the 
percentage change in turnover compared to the previous year. LOSS is an indicator variable that equals one for 
years following a loss year. LEVERAGE denotes the ratio of total debt scaled by total assets. SD_CFO and 
SD_TURNOVER denote the standard deviation of the cash flow from operations and turnover. We include year, 
subsidiary-industry (primary two-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes), subsidiary-country, and group fixed effects in all 
models. Standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary-country and subsidiary-industry level. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 1% level of their distributions. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses and calculated based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests 
Panel A: GUO Earnings Management Incentives 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  |DACC| |DACC| |DACC| |DACC| |DACC| 
INSPECTION 0.0702** 0.0707** 0.0698** 0.0754** 0.0748** 
 (2.161) (2.156) (2.145) (2.337) (2.308) 
POST_INSPECTION -0.0683** -0.0695* -0.0683** -0.0649* -0.0665* 
 (-2.077) (-2.035) (-2.068) (-1.746) (-1.717) 
SIZE -0.00993*** -0.00995*** -0.00999 -0.00995*** -0.00998** 
 (-2.854) (-2.901) (-1.682) (-3.259) (-2.077) 
ROA -0.0950 -0.0948 -0.0928 -0.0939 -0.0942 
 (-1.383) (-1.376) (-1.317) (-1.362) (-1.327) 
CFO 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.528*** 0.528*** 0.528*** 
 (16.02) (15.98) (15.46) (15.77) (15.10) 
TURNOVER_GROWTH 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
 (5.905) (5.980) (5.780) (5.354) (5.381) 
LOSS 0.0251 0.0253 0.0250 0.0248 0.0251 
 (1.287) (1.306) (1.227) (1.317) (1.274) 
LEVERAGE 0.0199 0.0200 0.0201 0.0201 0.0196 
 (0.710) (0.710) (0.728) (0.715) (0.707) 
SD_CFO 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 
 (5.104) (5.089) (5.102) (4.720) (4.727) 
SD_TURNOVER 0.0200* 0.0201* 0.0198* 0.0198 0.0197 
 (1.782) (1.765) (1.835) (1.565) (1.474) 
GUO_BIG4_AUDITOR -0.538**    -0.539** 
 (-2.569)    (-2.702) 
GUO_SMALL_GAIN  -0.0136   -0.0144 
  (-0.669)   (-0.690) 
GUO_FIN_CONSTRAINTS   0.103***  0.102*** 
   (2.811)  (3.036) 
D_TAX    -0.291 -0.254 
    (-0.979) (-0.847) 
      
Observations 3,559 3,559 3,559 3,559 3,559 
R-squared 0.413 0.413 0.413 0.413 0.414 
Year FE Yes 
Subsidiary-Industry FE Yes 
Subsidiary-Country FE Yes 
Group FE Yes 
SE Clustering Subsidiary-Country & Subsidiary-Industry 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Exclusion of Observations from Countries with most Observations 
 
Sample without 
Subsidiaries from France 
 
Sample without 
Subsidiaries with GUOs 
from Japan 
      
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  |DACC| |DACC|   |DACC| |DACC| 
INSPECTION 0.0357 0.0411  0.0207 0.0527** 
 (1.073) (1.456)  (0.839) (2.327) 
POST_INSPECTION -0.0724*** -0.0650**  -0.0590** -0.0495* 
 (-2.901) (-2.659)  (-2.522) (-1.774) 
SIZE  -0.0110***   -0.0105*** 
  (-4.054)   (-2.861) 
ROA  -0.110   -0.0125 
  (-1.427)   (-0.250) 
CFO  0.531***   0.540*** 
  (12.52)   (12.73) 
TURNOVER_GROWTH  0.108***   0.100*** 
  (4.175)   (6.503) 
LOSS  0.0166   0.0262 
  (1.043)   (1.335) 
LEVERAGE  0.0524*   0.00240 
  (1.907)   (0.0886) 
SD_CFO  0.163***   0.153*** 
  (4.740)   (2.912) 
SD_TURNOVER  0.0218   0.00358 
  (1.383)   (0.376) 
      
Observations 2,600 2,600  2,100 2,100 
R-squared 0.199 0.411  0.237 0.447 
Year FE Yes 
Subsidiary-Industry FE Yes 
Subsidiary-Country FE Yes 
Group FE Yes 
SE Clustering Subsidiary-Country & Subsidiary-Industry 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel C: Validation of Earnings Management Measure 
 
  (1) (2) 
  |DACC| |DACCc| 
INSPECTION 0.0697* 0.0197 
 (1.972) (1.465) 
POST_INSPECTION -0.0690* -0.0493** 
 (-2.015) (-3.045) 
SIZE -0.00983** -0.00488 
 (-2.525) (-1.509) 
ROA -0.0943 -0.0357 
 (-1.369) (-0.612) 
CFO 0.527*** 0.485*** 
 (14.41) (34.26) 
TURNOVER_GROWTH 0.0924*** 0.0959*** 
 (3.479) (6.744) 
LOSS 0.0285 0.0221* 
 (1.566) (1.895) 
LEVERAGE 0.0218 0.0208 
 (0.666) (1.477) 
SD_CFO 0.163*** 0.157*** 
 (3.827) (4.425) 
SD_TURNOVER 0.0206 0.00843 
 (1.609) (1.123) 
REV_REC_TA 0.00888  
 (0.795)  
L_ROA 0.0119  
 (0.334)  
L_INFLATION 0.000279  
 (0.0818)  
L_GDP_GROWTH 0.0710  
 (0.179)  
   
Observations 3,559 3,553 
R-squared 0.414 0.352 
Year FE Yes 
Subsidiary-Industry FE Yes 
Subsidiary-Country FE Yes 
Group FE Yes 
SE Clustering Subsidiary-Country & 
Subsidiary-Industry 
 
Table 5 presents robustness tests for our main result. International subsidiaries are treated if the auditor of their 
foreign U.S.-listed GUO is initially PCAOB-inspected during our sample period. We retain observations of 
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international subsidiaries for the control group if they are in the country-industry-year combinations of treated 
observations. We require control subsidiaries to have a foreign U.S.-listed GUO whose auditor is not initially 
PCAOB-inspected before or during our sample period. INSPECTION equals one for our treated sample of 
subsidiaries with an initial PCAOB inspection of their GUO auditor, and zero otherwise. POST_INSPECTION 
equals one for the first year following the final report year of the initial PCAOB inspection of a GUO’s auditor, 
and zero otherwise. SIZE denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA measures the absolute value of return 
on assets, CFO the absolute value of cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, and TURNOVER_GROWTH 
the percentage change in turnover compared to the previous year. LOSS is an indicator variable that equals one for 
years following a loss year. LEVERAGE denotes the ratio of total debt scaled by total assets. SD_CFO and 
SD_TURNOVER denote the standard deviation of the cash flow from operations and turnover. Table 5 Panel A 
presents the estimates of the regressions on absolute discretionary accruals (|DACC|) controlling for GUO earnings 
management incentives. GUO_BIG4_AUDITOR is an indicator variable set to one if the GUO is audited by 
KPMG, PwC, Ernst & Young, or Deloitte. GUO_SMALL_GAIN is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
GUO reports a net profit in the consolidated financial statement that is less than 1% of total assets, and zero 
otherwise. GUO_FIN_CONSTRAINTS is an indicator variable set to one if the CFO of the GUO scaled by current 
assets at the end of the previous year is below -0.5, and zero otherwise. D_TAX denotes the difference in corporate 
tax rates between the subsidiary country and the GUO country. Table 5 Panel B presents the estimates of the 
regressions on absolute discretionary accruals (|DACC|) with the exclusion of subsidiary-year observations from 
France in model (1) and (2) and with GUOs from Japan in model (3) and (4). Table 5 Panel C presents the estimates 
of the regression on absolute earnings management measures in two different research designs. In model (1), the 
dependent variable |DACC| denotes our basic measure of absolute discretionary accruals constructed by pooling 
regressions across years and subsidiary-industries (primary two-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes). REV_REC_TA denotes 
the difference in the change of revenue and receivables from t-1 to t scaled by lagged total assets. L_ROA measures 
the absolute value of return on assets in the previous year. L_INFLATION and L_GDP_GROWTH denote the 
inflation and growth in GDP of the previous year. Model (2) applies |DACCc| as dependent variable, that is 
constructed by pooling regressions across years, subsidiary industries (primary NACE Rev. 2 sections), and 
subsidiary countries. For both fixed effects and standard errors we classify subsidiary industry by primary NACE 
Rev. 2 sections in model (2). If not specified differently, we include year, subsidiary-industry (primary two-digit 
NACE Rev. 2 codes), subsidiary-country, and group fixed effects in all panels of Table 5. Standard errors are 
clustered at the subsidiary-country and subsidiary-industry level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
upper and lower 1% level of their distributions. t-statistics are presented in parentheses and calculated based on 
robust standard errors. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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